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Constitutional Mandate of Lex
In Foro Loci Delicti
Maurice R.

Franks*

IT IS THE WRITER'S HYPOTHESIS that a state is constitutionally required to apply its own law to a travel tort which has occurred within
its territorial jurisdiction and which is sued upon in its courts. In
other words, the interest analysis test - application of the law of the
state having the strongest interest in a particular issue - may not be
used in foro loci delicti (in the forum of the place of the tort).

Background
Traditionally, the tort choice of law rule has been that the tort
should be judged by the law of the place where it was committed
(lex loci delicti)1 In contrast, the choice of law rule favored today is

that the forum court shall apply the law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the injury and with the parties.In 1914, Justice Holmes articulated the traditional vested rights
approach in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown:

Whatever variations of opinion and practice there may have
been, it is established as the law of this court that when a person
recovers in one jurisdiction for a tort committed in another, he
does so on the ground of an obligation incurred at the place of the
tort that accompanies the person of the defendant elsewhere,
and that 2is not only the ground but the measure of maximum
recovery.
In 1952, Cheatham and Reese presaged the impending departure
from le.v loci delicti.3 In 1954, Judge Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals, the same man who later was to write the majority opinion in5
4
Babcock v. Jackson, wrote the opinion in the case of .Auten v. Anten.

Although that was strictly a contract case, the court adopted there
the "grouping of contracts" or "center of gravity" approach that is
presently replacing lex loci in tort situations as well.
In 1961, the New York Court dealt a severe blow to lex loci delicti
with the decision of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. 6 In that case, a
New York citizen flying from New York City was killed in an airplane
crash in Massachusetts. Recovery was threatened by a Massachusetts

6 Assistant

District Attorney, New Orleans, Louisiana; member of the Colorado, Louisiana, Tennessee and District of Columbia Bars.
Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., 48 Ohio St. 623, 30 N.E.
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916).

69 (1891)

; see J. H. BEALE,

"a Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191, N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2234 U.S.

542, 547 (1914).

3 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
4 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
5
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, (1954).
6
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
(1961).
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provision limiting damages. The court, while requiring the plaintiff
to sue on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, refused to enforce
its provision limiting damages to $15,000 and, instead, applied New
York law. The court reasoned that it was "unfair and anachronistic"
to subject a traveling New York citizen to the law of a state through
which he might never have intended to pass and that Massachusetts,
the fortuitous place of the tort, had no "controlling concern or interest
in the amount of tort recovery."
But the final blow to lex loci delicti came in 1963, when this same
court threw out all pretense of adherence to the doctrine. Judge Fuld,
writing the majority opinion in that now famous landmark decision
respecting tort cases involving multi-state contacts, Babcock v. Jackson,
stated:
The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (§ 384), and until recently unquestioningly followed in this court . . . has been that the sub-

stantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence
are determinable by the law of the place of the tort. .

.

. It had its

conceptual foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that
a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law
of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for
its existence and extent solely on such law.
the Kilberg case did not expressly adopt the
•
.
"center of gravity" theory, its weighing of the contacts or interests
of the respective jurisdictions to determine their bearing on the
issue of7 the extent of the recovery is consistent with that approach.
He then determined that New York's interest in the driver-guest relation between two New York citizens was greater than that of
Ontario, the place of the tort, and proceeded to apply New York's
more generous law of compensation to a guest. In Ontario a motor
vehicle driver was not liable for his guest's injuries.
The New York interest analysis approach has been adopted in
many states.8 However, not all courts agree with such a conclusion.
,Although

7 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
8 As of this writing, the rule in Babcock v. Jackson is the law in Alaska, Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Arizona, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,
447 P.2d 254, 258 (1968) ; California, Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730,
63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1967) ; District of Columbia, Meyers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.
C. Cir. 1967); Florida, Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 745 (Fla.
1967) (adopts Babcock but rejects Kilberg) ; Illinois, Graham v. General U. S. Grant
Post 2665, 97 Il1.App.2d 139, 239 N.E.2d 856, 861 (1968); Wartell v. Formusa, 34
I1.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) ; Indiana, Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind.App. 655, 237
N.E.2d 116 (1968); Iowa, Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1968); Kentucky, Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260 n.1 (Ky. 1967) ; Maine, Beaulieu v.
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Maine 1970) ; Minnesota, Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139,
158 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1968), Kopp v. Rechtizigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526, 528
n.2 (1966) ; Mississippi, Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968) ; Missouri, Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 194. (Mo. 1969), Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402
S.W. 321, 322 n.1 (Mo. 1966) ; New Hampshire, Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d
205 (1966), Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781, 782 (1966); New Jersey,
Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693, 695 (Super. Ct. 1968) ; New
(Continued on next page)
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9
The rule in Babcock expressly has been rejected in Arkansas, Dela3
12
10
Louisiana,"- Maryland, and Michigan.1 Four other states,
ware,
while not expressly rejecting Babcock, appear still to follow lex loci
delicti.14 The less logical rationale of Kilberg has been expressly rejected even in certain states that have adopted the Babcock test of
interest analysis; among these Florida,'" Missouri, 16 Oklahoma, 17 and
Texas. i 8

Most frequently cited among the decisions refusing to adopt inter1
est analysis in tort situations is the Delaware case of Friday v. Smoot. D
Chief Justice Wolcott, writing for the court, recognized the potential
unfairness of lex loci delicti in some instances but, referring to both
the certainty of the rule and the significant rights that would be effected by a change from the rule, deferred any change to the legislature.
The usual arguments against interest analysis are based on considerations of certainty and public policy, as specified by dissenting
Judge Van Voorhis in Babcock:
(Continued from preceding page)
York, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
See also Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965)
Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966); Oregon, Casey v. Manson
Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898, 902-903 (1967) ; Pennsylvania, Kuchnic
v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897, 899, n. 4 (1966); Griffith v. United Airlines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964) ; Rhode Island, Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I.
290, cert. dismissed 393, U.S. 957, 24-3 A.2d 917, 922 n.l (1968) ; Texas, Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 190, 194 (Tex. 1968) (adopts Babcock but rejects Kilberg) ; Wisconsin, Zellinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis.2d 98, 156
N.W.2d 466, 469 (1968), Heath v Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967), Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1965).
Kilberg appears to be the law in California, Reich v. Purcell, supra; The District
of Columbia, Meyers v. Gaither, supra; Illinois, Graham v. General U. S. Grant Post
2665, supra; Iowa, Fuerste v. Bemis, suPra; New Jersey, Marshall v. Geo. M. Brewster
& Son, Inc., 68 N.J. Super. 399, 172 A.2d 458, 462 (Super. Ct. 1961) ; New York, Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Oregon, Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Cu., supra; Pennsylvania, Kuchnic v. McCrory, supra, Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., supra; Rhode Island, Woodward v.
Stewart, supra; Wisconsin, Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra; Mississippi, see Browning v.
Shakelford, 196 So.2d 36S (Miss. 1967) (concurring opinion by Ethridge, J_).
9 McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1966).
211 A.2d 594. (1965).
Del. -,
10 Friday v. Smoot, 1 Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
1' White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763, 766 (1966).
13 Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
14 Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) ; McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan.
625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965) ; Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963) ; Oshiek
v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964.). But see Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hdwre.
v. Fidelty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 4.69 (4th Cir. 1963) (North Carolina conflicts
law).
15 Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 74.3, 747 (Fla. 1967).
16 Girth v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Mo. 1966). But see Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321, 322 n.1 (Mo. 1966).
17 Cherokee Laboratories v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965).
18 Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 190, 194 (Tex. 1968).
211 A.2d 594 (1965). See Griffith v. United Airlines,
Del. -,
19 Friday v. Smoot, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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Attempts to make the law or public policy of New York State
prevail over the laws and policies of other States where citizens
of New York State are concerned are simply a form of extraterritoriality which can be turned against us wherever actions are
brought in the courts of New York which involve citizens of other
States. This is no substitute for uniform State laws or for obtain-

ing uniformity by covering the subject by Federal Law . . . Im-

porting the principles of extraterritoriality into the conflicts of
laws between the States of the United States can only make confusion worse confounded-2 0
Indeed, it has been said that "[a] New York lawyer with a guest
statute case has more need of a ouija board today than a copy of
21
Shepard's citations."
But such criticisms are not of a constitutional nature. It is to the
constitutional ramifications of interest analysis that this article now
will turn.
General Constitutional Ramifications
Interest analysis is subject to the constitutional limitations imposed by the commerce clause, 22 the full faith and credit clause, 213 the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, 24 and the equal protec25
tion clause.
An attack based on the commerce clause was considered cursorily
and rejected in the recent Wisconsin case of Conklin v. Homer.26 But
in the recent Rhode Island case of Woodward v. Stewart 27 the court
acknowledged the existence of other constitutional limitations on the
tort choice of law. Particularly, the court cited the full faith and
credit, due process and equal protection clauses as requiring a forum
court to "have some rational basis" for the application of its own laws.
The full faith and credit clause merely requires that, "if a state
gives some faith to the public acts of another state . . . then it must

give full faith and credit to those public acts." 8 A state's common law
is entitled to the same faith and credit as are its statutes. 29
20 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
21 Rosenberg, Two Fiews on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1967).
22 U. S. Const. art. I, § 8.
21Id. Art. IV, § 1 Art. IV, which refers to the privileges and immunities of state, as
opposed to national, citizenship, should not be confused with the privileges and immunities clause of amend. XIV, which protects only privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship.
24 U. S. Const. art IV,

§ 2.

25

Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
26 "We see no burden upon interstate movement as the result of the choice of Wisconsin
law." Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 585 (1968) ; cf. note, Conflict
of Laws-Torts-Law of Forum Applies to Accident Invsolvsing Only Out-o-State
Motorists, 22 VAND. L. Rev. 203 (1968). For an interesting application of the commerce
clause, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U. S. 520 (1959).
27 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 921 (1968) cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957.
2 Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 311 U.S. 586, 625 (1947).
29Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706
(1963).
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Full faith and credit is sometimes also a matter of due process.
Concerning this, Justice Brandeis wrote in the 1952 decision of Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper:
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause
of action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce
it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive defense
under the applicable law of another State, as under the circumstances here presented, subjects
the defendant to irremediable
30
liability. This may not be done.
In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,31 which grows from the same
facts as Kilberg, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the doctrine of Kilberg violates neither
the full faith and credit clause nor the due process clause. The court
reasoned that the defendant airline had no vested property right under
the Massachusetts rule of limiting damage awards for wrongful death
and, therefore, there could be no due process deprivation. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Neither the full faith and credit clause nor the due process clause
is applicable to a tort choice of law problem unless the forum is in a
different state from the situs of the tort. Only in such a situation is there
any foreign leox loci delicti to which faith, credit or comity might be
given. Interest analysis has withstood attacks based upon the full
faith and credit clause and upon the due process clause.
Conversely, neither the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV nor the equal protection clause is applicable to a tort choice of
law problem unless the forum is in the same state as the situs of the tort.
The law of privileges, immunities and equal protection is substantially
different from the law of full faith, credit and due process.
The interest analysis approach has not yet been subjected to an
attack based upon the privileges and immunities clause of article IV
or upon the equal protection clause. Manifestly, such a challenge best
can be presented in foro loci delicti. The constitutional implications of
interest analysis in that singular situation now will be examined.
Lex in Foro Loci Delicti
1 32
The recent New Jersey case of Maffatone v. Woodson is illustrative. A New York resident borrowed the car of another New Yorker
and drove several passengers into New Jersey, where the accident
occurred. One of the passengers was killed. In a wrongful death action

30 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932); accord, Pacific Ing. Co. v. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)
Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law., 25 WASH. U. L. Q.
27 (1939).
21 307 F.2d 131, rev'd on rehearing en bane, 309 F.2d 553, 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). But see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890);
Anderson v. State, 80 Okla.Crim. 90, 126 P. 840, 84-6 (1912).
"99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (1968).
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against the owver of the car, the New Jersey forum applied the New
York statute which holds a vehicle owner liable for the negligence of
any driver using a vehicle with the owner's permission. The New
Jersey court made its choice of laws on the basis of New York's "most
significant contacts with the affected parties to the litigation and the
specific issues raised ....,32a Thus the New Jersey court applied the
Babcock test and held that, owing to the presence of substantial New
York contacts, the agency law of New York would be applied. Other
instances can be found of the Babcock interest analysis test being
applied in foro loci delicti.33 But generally the courts have applied their
own local law in similar fact-and-forum situations, so reaching the
constitutional result, despite unconstitutional reasoning, merely by
holding that there are substantial forum contacts. 34
According to this writer's thesis, the Babcock test may not be used
in foro loci delicti. The clear import of the United States Constitution
is that when a resident of one state travels in another, he does so on
equal footing with the citizens of the state in which he travels. He is en-

titled to be treated no differently than were he a local resident. Accordingly, if the sojourner's vehicle chances to collide with the vehicle
of another citizen of his own home state, 35 the courts of the state of
the accident must treat these two foreigners no differently than they
would treat two local citizens. Thus, if a citizen of, say, Nebraska
chances to be sued in, say, Louisiana for a travel tort which occurred
in Louisiana, the Nebraska defendant must be accorded all the defenses that would be available to a resident of Louisiana, including
the defense of contributory negligence. 36 Likewise, the Nebraska plaintiff must be treated as if he were a citizen of Louisiana and may not be
subjected to the Nebraska guest passenger statute.37 This view is
based on the privileges and immunities clause of article IV and on
the equal protection clause of amendment XIV.
The Legislative Meaning
Article IV had its genesis in the Articles of Confederation,3" and
was intended to cover the travel situation.3 9 But the leading case so
32ai d. at -;
3

240 A.2d at 695-6.

,See, e.q., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hdwre. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469
(4th Cit. 1963).

34 Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).

-15 Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968). Leflar goes one step further and suggests:
"Thus, if two or more interest-connected states have identical or compatible rules of
law. and the law of the third state is different, it would be possible to choose as governing the laws of the two states as an undifferentiated but coordinated unit, as against the
law of the third state .... The constitutional permissibility of this would be difficult
to attack." Leflar, supra note 29.
6 In this hypothetical situation, compare Robins v. Sandoz, 177 Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648
(1964), 'with Roberts v. Meche, 204 So.2d 592 (La. App. 1967).
37 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 (1967).

2 Articles of Confederation, art IV.
"Corfield v. Corvell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230)
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holding, Corfield v. Coryell, 0 was overruled by the politically moti41
vated decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.
During the reconstruction debates, Congress wished to undo the
effect of the Dred Scott decision primarily because of certain regrettable travel incidents in the south, notably, the unfortunate experience
of Massachusetts Judge Samuel Hoar while traveling in South Carolina
in 1844,42 and later, travel experiences of carpetbaggers after the Civil
War. 43 It was the intention of Congress to reinstate the protection of
the original understanding of the privileges and immunities clause of
Article IV is it existed before the Dred Scott decision. This was accomplished by incorporating those rights originally guaranteed by Article
IV, Section 2, into the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That newer clause is even broader than Article IV in
that it applies to all "persons" rather than just to state "citizens."
During the debates on the fourteenth amendment, Representative
Hiram Price, Republican from Iowa, remarked, in essence, that the
Constitution had failed to protect the rights of citizens traveling in
foreign states and that it was necessary that the Constitution be reconstructed to guarantee the protection of all citizens while traveling. 44 Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge, Republican from Vermont, a learned man in the law said:
It is intended to enable Congress to give to all citizens the
inalienable rights of life and liberty, and to every citizen in whatever State he may be that protection to his
45 property which is
extended to the other citizens of the State.
Moreover, during the 1866 debates on the Civil Rights bill, Senator
Lyman Trumbull clearly indicated that this travel protection was
intended to cover the tort situation. Coming from Trumbull, the remarks are significant. A former Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court,
Senator Trumbull understood the law. And, at the very time of these
remarks, Trumbull was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
which only a short time before had reported out the fourteenth
amendment. Referring to an order issued under presidential authority
by Major General Sickles, Trumbull said: "It is a very significant
order."4" The order read in part:
All injuries to the person or property committed by or upon
freed persons shall be punished in the manner provided by the
40 Id.

41 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1856), cf. Bischoff, Dred Scott after a Century, 6
J. PuB. L. 411 (1957); Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered, 38 MI4NN. L. REV.

16 (1953).

42 CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., S. SO (April 6, 1871) Joint Committee on Southern
Disorders).
43
Id. S. 228 (April 13, 1871).
44CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., H. 1269 (March 8, 1866).
45
1d. H. 1088 (Feb. 28, 1866).
401d. S. 1759 (April 4, 1866).
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for like injuries to the persons or property
laws of South Carolina
47

of citizens thereof.
But perhaps the best evidence of legislative meaning may be
found in the remarks of Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio.
Bingham was a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, a
Special Judge Advocate at the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, and
later one of the House managers of the 1868 impeachment of President Johnson. But most important of all, Congressman Bingham was
the draftsman of the very section of the fourteenth amendment here
in question. Said Bingham of his handiwork:
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity
of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons,
whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal
in this Union in the rights of life and
protection in every State
48
liberty and property?
Can there be any doubt that the original understanding of the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, as incorporated into the
equal protection clause of amendment XIV, covers the travel situation,
and that when a resident of one state travels in another, he does so
on equal footing with the citizens of the state in which he travels?
Can there be any doubt that the sojourner is entitled to be treated no
differently than were he a local resident?
Avins writes:
The Privileges and Immunities Clause at least requires an
understanding of what were deemed to be the privileges and
immunities of citizenship a century ago, and the Due Process
Clause may likewise require an analysis of what the courts had
decided to be due process in 1866. But the Equal Protection Clause
has a plain meaning.
The first key concept in this clause is, "No state shall***
within its jurisdiction***." This immediately limits the subject
of the clause to things a state can do only within its jurisdiction.
It is obvious that a state can confer benefits on persons not within
its jurisdiction. It can send them money, for example.4 9
As "it must be kept in mind that the clause cannot be invoked
unless the action of a state denies the equal protection of the laws to
persons 'within its jurisdiction,' "50 the present writer's thesis at first
sight would appear inapplicable other than in foro loci delicti. In the
strict Babcock situation, the parties were not traveling "within" the
jurisdiction of the forum state, New York, when the tort occurred.
They can assert no claim to equal protection of lex loci delicti. The
transitory forum is not under any direct mandate of either the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection clause.
47 Id

48Id. H. 1090 (Feb. 28, 1866).
49Avins, Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385,
425 (1966).
11 16 AM. JLur. 2d Constitutional Law § 516, at 901 (1964).
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Likewise, the writer's thesis is inapplicable to any situation other
than the travel tort. Cases involving rights of status or contract, including the contract of marriage and its relationship to the doctrine of
interspousal immunity, are not subject to the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection clause.
In the 1855 case of Conner v. Elliott, Justice Curtis said of a
Louisiana marriage relationship:
Rights, attached by the law to contracts, by reason of the
place where such contracts are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to those contracts, cannot
be deemed "privileges to a citizen," within the meaning of the
constitution. 5 1
The Conner decision preceded the fourteenth amendment, and was
52
discussed approvingly in Congress during the reconstruction debates.
It would appear that the Conner interpretation of the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV was incorporated into the equal protection clause of amendment XIV. That interpretation excludes rights
of status or contract.
Similarly, the two constitutional provisions here being considered
do not relate to political rights such as voting. As Senator Garrett
Davis, an attorney and a Whig Democrat from Kentucky, remarked
"... the first clause of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution . . .of course . . .does not include political rights."5' 3
In summary, article IV, section 2, had its genesis in the Articles
of Confederation5 4 and was intended to cover the travel situation.
After the Civil War, it was the intention of Congress to reinstate
the protection of the original understanding of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV as it existed before the Dred Scott
decision. This was accomplished with the equal protection clause of
amendment XIV.
Although the two clauses do not apply unless one is traveling
"within its jurisdiction", and do not apply to status, contract, or poliitcal rights, there can be no doubt that Congress wished to create
travel equality. Such was the manifest legislative meaning.
The Judicial Understanding
After the Dred Scott decision, the next major judicial interpretation of article IV, section 2, was not until after the Civil War. In the
very same year the fourteenth amendment was ratified, Justice Field
wrote the opinion in Panl v. Virginia.55 That opinion operated to restore
(1855). Accordingly, the writer feels that the holding in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246 (1954) is constitutional.
52See, e.g., Comc. GLOBE, 4-2nd Cong., 1st Ses., S. 499 (April 6, 1871).
51 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593

31d. 41st Cong., 1st Sess., S. 1511 (Feb. 23, 1970).
54For an excellent discussion of the history of art. IV, § 2, see Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
239 (1898).
558 Wall. 168 (1968).
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the Corfield understanding of article IV privileges and immunities.
Wrote Justice Field:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship
in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating
legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right
of free egress into other States, and egress from them; it insures
them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens
of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and
in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States
the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no
provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute
the citizens of the United States one people as this. Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each
State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving
them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States;
it would not have constituted the Union which now exists.5 6
Four years after the Paul decision, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the landmark Slaughter House Cases.57 Justice Miller,
writing for the Supreme Court, was careful to point out that the "sole
purpose" of the constitutional provision in question was to require
each and every state to grant to citizens of other states the same privileges and immunities, no matter how qualified or restricted, as were
granted to its own citizens when the former are within the state's
jurisdiction. For example, in Cole v. Cunningham. the court held that
article IV protects access to a state's courts and communicates "all the
privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same state would
be entitled to under like circumstances ....,"5 Additionally, both the
article IV provision and the amendment XIV clause have been used
to require non-discriminatory tax treatment for foreign corporate
actions.5 9 And, in 1934, the Maryland Court of Appeals struck down
a state statute which provided a different measure of damages for
wrongful death when the deceased child and his destitute parents
were both residents of the state than when they were not both res60
idents of the state.
The concepts of privileges and immunities and of equal protection
have not changed much in the last century. Professors Currie and
Schreter concede:
If the validity of a contract is determined by the law of the
place of contracting; if the consequences of a tort are determined
56Id. at 180.
5716 Wall. 36 (1872).
5
"Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 114 (1890).
51Southern Railway Co.v. Greene, 216 U.S. 4-00 (1910).
60 State v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 172 A. 274, 278 (1934). For a most remarkable equal protection decision from the Wisconsin court, see Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666,
285 N.W.426 (1939).
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by the law of the place of harm; if matters of procedure are determined by the law of the forum-then problems of invidious discrimination apparently cannot arise.
...It happens that we espouse a conflict-of-laws method which
brings these troublesome problems to light. .

.

. Whenever we

make the statement that a state should apply its protective laws
when the person claiming the benefit of the protective policy is
a citizen, or resident, of the state, we should like to be understood
as adding that it should apply those laws also for the protection
of such other persons as are entitled under the Constitution to
parity of treatment with local citizens ...
Perhaps the best advertised of the privileges and immunities
of citizenship is the right to travel freely among the states. The
Supreme Court has vindicated this right of "ingress and egress,"
but never in terms of article IV. In Crandall v. Nevada a tax upon
every person leaving the state was held in conflict with the
implied right of a citizen to travel in connection with the affairs
of the national government; and in Edwards v. California a statute
making it a criminal offense to bring an indigent nonresident
61 into
the state was held in conflict with the commerce clause.
The conflict of laws method that Currie espouses concededly may
be unconstitutional in certain specific situations. One such situation is
where the forum is in the same state as the situs of the tort.
But the trend well may be back in the constitutional direction.
Professor Leflar admits:
Most of the states are becoming accustomed to the fact that
a large proportion of the human beings who at any given moment
are working or playing within their borders will have ties with
other states as well. An effect of this is that the states are less
concerned than they once were with protection of the local citizen as distinguished from the "stranger," and more inclined than
they once were to promulgate and enforce laws that apply to both
equally, well beyond the minimum equalities prescribed by the
federal constitution. Visitors as well as residents may be protected by "good" local laws. The domicile of parties in one state
or another has less significance today, and may well have far less
in another generation, than 62it once had as a basis for locating
true governmental interests.
The present writer maintains that traveling visitors must accept
the equal protection not only of Leflar's "good" local laws, but of
all local laws not involving rights of status or contract. The United
States Supreme Court, however, in certain situations has granted
limited recognition to the interest analysis approach. It is to that
obiter dicta contra that this article now will turn.
61 Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of La'Ws: Privileges

and Immunities, 69 YALE L. J. 1323, 1325 (1960) ; see, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35
(1867) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1940).
62 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Lawy, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 29394 (1966) ; accord, Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
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Obiter Dicta Contra
The two constitutional provisions here being considered do not
apply to status, contract, or political rights. Interest analysis, therefore, seems perfectly proper in contract situations. 63 In the 1946 contract case of Vanston Committee v. Green, the Supreme Court applied

a grouping of contracts test. 64 That application seems to have been
correct.
Likewise proper have been the applications of interest analysis
in federal tort situations. In 1961, Chief Justice Warren wrote the
opinion in Richards v. United States. He said:

The question to be decided in this case is what law a Federal
District Court should apply in an action brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act where an act of negligence occurs in one State
and results in an injury and death in another State.... Recently
there has been a tendency on the part of some States to depart
from the general conflicts rule in order to take into account the
interests of the State having significant contact with the parties
to the litigation. We can see no compelling reason to saddle the
Act with an interpretation that would prevent the federal courts
the
from implementing this policy in choice-of-law rules where
State in which the negligence occurred has adopted it. 65
Similarly, in Laurietzen v. Larsen, the Supreme Court applied
Danish law in a seaman's suit filed under the Jones Act. 66
Now it is elementary that neither the Jones Act nor the Federal
Tort Claims Act 67 is a state law. But article IV, section 2, refers only
to privileges and immunities of state citizenship. 68 And amendment
XIV, secton 1, demands only the equal protection of state laws.6 9
Not only are the Supreme Court cases applying interest analysis
correct, but the constitutional exceptions here presented could not
even have been raised in those cases.
Nor are the holdings in Kilberg, Pearson and Babcock necessarily
wrong when limited to their facts. The privileges and immunities
clause of article IV and the equal protection clause of amendment
XIV were singularly inapplicable in Kilberg, Pearson and Babcock, as
those cases were not filed in foro loci delicti.

The writer has confined his hypothesis to interstate travel torts
where suit is filed in foro loci delicti. And the answer to any possible
objections to the present writer's hypothesis already has been stated
63 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591 (1855).
64 Vanston Bond Holders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1946).
On statutes of limitations and borrowing statutes, see Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 562 (1920).
65 369 U.S. 1, 2 (1961).
164 6 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
6728 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
68 State v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 172 A. 274, 278 (1934).
69Avins, supra note 9, at 425; 16 AM. Ju. 2d Constitutional Law § 516, at 901. See also
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 471, 3 N.E.2d 597, 598, 108 A.L.R. 1120 (1936).
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very succinctly by a very eminent judge in a very important case:
"[li]t is not amiss to point out that the question here posed was
neither raised nor considered in those cases and that the question has
never been presented..
Conclusions
Some might object that compliance with the clear constitutional
mandate would wreak havoc upon the currently fashionable approach
to conflicts. It is doubtful that acceptance of this writer's view would
have one tenth the impact that was felt when Judge Fuld released
71
his decision in Babcock. But such policy considerations are irrelevant.
Those who merely disagree with results, but who have no antithetical constitutional reasoning to offer, respectfully are advised to
exercise their amendment I rights to urge Congress to avail itself of
its article V prerogatives. Alternatively, Congress could legislate a
72
choice-of-law code.
Others might ask whether the equal protection clause demands
equal protection of the laws of the fortiun or equal protection of the laws
of the place of the tort. All the present writer safely can opine is that the
equal protection clause prohibits choice of law discriminations in travel
tort situations based on the state of origin of the parties. Even if the
forum constitutionally is free to choose between lex fori and lex loci
delicti (which, incidentally, must of necessity be identical in foro loci
delicti), the forum may not apply lex dorniciliiunless lex domicilii happens also to be le.r fori, in which case the forum arguably is giving to
persons "within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws."
In any event, the Babcock test may not be used in foro loci delicti.
The clear import of the United States Constitution is that when a
resident of one state travels in another, he does so on equal footing
with the citizens of the state in which he travels. He is entitled to
be protected there no differently than he would be were he a local
resident.
70

Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).

71 U. S. Const. art VI.

12 Leflar, supra note 29 at 731. See also CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., H. 1088 (Feb.
28, 1866) (fourteenth amendment) (remarks of Representative Woodbridge).
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